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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN RE: : 
JOHN S. DAVIS : Case No. 870051 
: Priority No. 4 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Does the Utah State Bar have jurisdiction to 
hold disciplinary proceedings on Mr. Davis under Formal Complaint 
#F-198? 
2. Is the Utah State Bar's Recommendation for disciplinary 
action excessive and inequitable? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
John S. Davis, a member of the Utah State Bar, was 
charged by information with theft, a second degree felony 
(Ex. 4, Pg. 3). A jury found him guilty on October 20, 1982 
(Ex. 4, Pg. 164). The trial court reduced defendant's conviction 
to one for a third degree felony and placed him on probation 
on November 26, 1982 (Ex. 4, Pg. 235 - 37). That probation 
was terminated by the trial court in October, 1985 (R. 244 in Brief 
of Appellant filed Feb. 5, 1987). 
In early 1982 the Utah State Bar began disciplinary 
proceedings #F-137 against Mr. Davis based upon the actions 
which gave rise to the criminal action (R. 11 of #F-137). The Utah 
-1-
State Bar made a motion to this Court to have Mr. Davis placed 
on Interim Suspension (R. 16 of #F-137) before the criminal trial, 
but that motion was denied (R. 19 of #F-137). Following the 
criminal trial, that motion was renewed and Mr. Davis was placed 
on Interim Suspension by order of this Court dated March 7, 
1983 (R. 29 of #F-137) . 
On January 4, 1984 the Utah State Bar's Complaint 
#F-137 was amended to include a second count alleging the 
conviction by the trial court (R. 53 of #F-137). Mr. Davis 
challenged the procedural correctness in bringing about the 
second count, and the matter was referred back to the Ethics 
and Discipline Committee to correct the defective procedure. 
The Ethics Committee issued formal complaint #F-190 (R. 27 of 
#F-198, paragraphs #13 and #14. See also Appellant's motion to 
supplement the record for the full content of #F-190) which was 
essentially a duplicate of the second count of #F-137. Complaint 
#F-190 also contained procedural defects, so it was dismissed 
(R. 27 of #F-198, paragraphs #13 and #14) and Complaint #F-198 
was issued in its stead (R. 25 of #F-198) 
The second count of #F-137 was dismissed at that point 
because it was a duplication of Complaint #F-198 (R. 161 of #F-137). 
The two complaints, #F-137 and #F-198 were then consolidated 
(R.164-165 of #F-137). One month before the Panel Hearing, the 
first count of #F-137 was dismissed (R. 231 of #F-137) and the 
hearing was held on the allegations of Complaint #F-198, which 
resulted in the Findings, Conclusions and Recommendation now 
on appeal before this Court. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The pertinent facts in this case are in the dates 
and the sequence of the documents that were filed in this 
case and the bearing that they have on the jurisdiction of 
the Board of Commissioners of the Utah State Bar and also 
the reasonableness of the discipline which is recommended. 
The Order for Interim Suspension from the practice of 
law was issued March 7, 1983, but the amendment to add the 
allegation of the conviction was not initiated until Aug. 29, 1983 
(R. 37 of #F-137) and accepted until Dec. 15, 1983 (R. 49 of #F-137), 
Complaint #F-190, replacing the allegations of count II were filed 
March 6, 1985 (Referred to in R. 27 of #F-198, para. #13 & #14), 
and Complaint #F-198 was filed April 30, 1985, replacing #F-190 
(R. 25 of #F-198). On October 28, 1985 the Panel ordered consoli-
dation of #F-137 and #F-198 and dismissal of count II of #F-137 at 
the request of Bar Counsel (R. 164 of #F-137). On April 10, 1986, 
count I of #F-137 was dismissed by stipulation (R. 231 of #F-137). 
The Panel Hearing was May 15, 1986. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The authority and jurisdiction to discipline a 
member of the Utah State Bar is given to the Board of Bar 
Commissioners and their delegated committees by the Rules 
of Discipline of the Utah State Bar. They cannot exceed the 
jurisdiction that is specifically given to them. 
The procedural rules in this case have been compounded 
in such a way as to cause an excessive and inequitable burden 
on the Defendant if the recommendation of the Bar is accepted. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE UTAH STATE BAR LACKED JURISDICTION IN FORMAL 
COMPLAINT #F-198 BECAUSE MR. DAVIS WAS NOT A 
MEMBER IN GOOD STANDING AT THE TIME IT WAS FILED. 
The Rules of Discipline of the Utah State Bar, which 
were in effect in April of 1985, when Formal Complaint #F-
198 was filed, say in Rule III, DEFINITIONS, that "A 'member 
of the Bar' refers to a lawyer in good standing on the official 
roster of attorneys of the Supreme Court of Utah and the Utah 
State Bar." Rule VII, DISCIPLINE AND SANCTIONS, says in sub-
paragraph (b), "Suspension of a lawyer shall remove said 
individual as a member of the Bar of the Court in good standing 
. . . ." Sub-paragraph (b)(1) says " . . . the Court may issue 
an interim order suspending a lawyer . . .", which is what 
this Court did to Mr. Davis on March 7, 1983. That Order 
has remained in effect to this date. Rule VIII, COMPLAINT 
OF UNPROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, is the Rule that gives the Utah 
State Bar jurisdiction to impose disciplinary proceedings, 
but that jurisdiction has been limited to a "member of the 
Bar", which has been defined as a member in good standing. 
POINT II 
THE UTAH STATE BAR LACKED JURISDICTION IN FORMAL 
COMPLAINT #F-198 BECAUSE THE ALLEGATIONS CONTAINED 
IN THAT COMPLAINT BECAME MOOT AFTER THE SAME 
ALLEGATIONS HAD BEEN PREVIOUSLY VOLUNTARILY DISMISSED 
TWICE IN FORMAL COMPLAINTS #F-137 and #F-190. 
Rule XII, DISCIPLINARY HEARING BEFORE COMMISSION, 
of The Rules of Discipline of the Utah State Bar, and also 
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the new Procedures of Discipline of the Utah State Bar, adopted 
in September of 1985, state in Rule XII(b) "The rules of evidence 
and procedure applicable to the conduct of non-jury civil 
trials in the District Courts of the State of Utah shall govern 
the hearing on a Formal Committee Complaint." Rule 41(a) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure says that ". . .a notice 
of dismissal operates as an adjudication upon the merits when 
filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in any court of 
the United States or of any state an action." 
In this case, the allegations of the conviction 
were dismissed twice by the voluntary action of Bar Counsel 
in Complaint #F-137 and Complaint #F-190. Therefore, when 
Count I of Complaint #F-137 was voluntarily dismissed one 
month prior to the Panel Hearing, the Board of Commissioners 
lost jurisdiction to discipline Mr. Davis on these matters. 
POINT III 
IT IS EXCESSIVE AND INEQUITABLE DISCIPLINE TO 
DISBAR MR. DAVIS AFTER HAVING HIM ON INTERIM 
SUSPENSION FOR OVER FOUR YEARS DURING THE PENDENCY 
OF THE DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS. 
The maximum time period for suspension is t^ vo years, 
and an attorney, under the rules, may begin to apply for re-
admission after five years from the date of disbarment. If 
this Court orders disbarment of Mr. Davis now, it will be 
a minimum of nine years that he will have been prevented from 
practicing law before he can begin to apply for readmission. 
That is excessive and mequitaole by the normal standards, 
and in this particular case n: is aggrevated by the fact that 
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Bar Counsel had to issue three consecutive Formal Complaints 
and several amendments before this matter was finally brought 
to a hearing, and then one month before the hearing the allega-
tions of the first count were voluntarily dismissed. 
CONCLUSION 
Because the Board of Commissioners of the Utah State 
Bar lacked jurisdiction to discipline Mr. Davis on the matters 
before it, the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and the 
Recommendations should be reversed. This Court should decide 
that if disciplinary action is necessary, that the four years 
that Mr. Davis has spent on interim suspension is sufficient 
and should order termination of that suspension. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this £Oth day of -May, 1987. 
JOHN S. DAVIS 
Appellant Pro Se 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that four true and exact copies 
of the foregoing Brief were mailed, postage prepaid, to Jo 
Carol Nesset-Sale, Bar Counsel, 425 East First South, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84111, this 2-eth day of *»y, 1987. 
f.L'Di.lDUi'i 
BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN RE: 
JOHN S. DAVIS 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW AND RECOMMENDATION OF 
THE BOARD OF BAR COMMISSIONERS 
F-137 & F-198 
The Board of Bar Commissioners having reviewed and 
considered the Findings, Conclusions and Recommendation of the 
Hearing Committee in the above-entitled case, hereby affirm 
the attached Hearing Committee determinations. 
Dated this day of , 
198 . 
Bert L. Dart 
President, Utah State Bar 
425 East 100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Findings - F-137 & F-198 
John S. Davis 
Page 2 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Recommendation was mailed certified mail, return receipt 
requested to John S. Davis, 1068 N. Grand Circle, Provo, Utah 
84604 and hand-delivered^ to Jo Carol NesseJb-Sale, Bar Counsel, 
Utah State Bar, this - -'t'v— day of J Vv. >.
 ; /y \ \ 
198J_. / 
i c • 
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BEFORE THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS 
OF THE UTAH STATE BAR 
IN RE: 
JOHN S. DAVIS 
NOTICE OF FINDINGS OF CONCLU-
SIONS AND RECOMMENDATION 
No. F-19S and F-137 
Consolidated 
Notice is hereby given that the Hearing Committee Panel 
of the Utah State Bar has submitted Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions and Recommendation in the above-entitled case. 
Pursuant to Rule XII (d) of the Procedures of Discipline 
of the Utah State Bar, a copy of these Findings, Conclusions 
and Recommendation shall be served up on Bar Counsel and the 
attorney in question or his counsel. Bar Counsel or the 
attorney in question shall have 10 days from the date of 
receipt of the Findings, Conclusions and Recommendation to 
petition the Board for amendment or modification thereof, in 
substance or in form. Said petition shall be filed with the 
Executive Director of the Bar, and shall succinctly specify 
any proposed amendments, additions, or deletions setting forth 
the basis therefor including any citation of authorities. 
The Board of Bar Commissioners will consider the 
above-entitled matter at its regularly scheduled meeting on 
December 19, 1986. 
Dated this day of November, 1986, 
S^phei 
i&ecutive Director 
Certificate of Mailing 
I hereby certify that the foregoing Notice of Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions and Recommendation in No* F-198 and F-137 
consolidated have been mailed certified return receipt 
requested to John S. Davis, 1068 N. Grand Circle, Provo, Utah 
84604 and hand-delivered to Karin S* Hobbs, Associate Bar 
Counsel, this £\ & day of November, 1986. 
Q^^^ 
BEFORE OF THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS 
OF THE UTAH STATE BAR 
In Re: 
JOHN S. DAVIS 
> FINDINGS OF FACT, 
1 CONCLUSIONS AND 
i RECOMMENDATION 
i No* F-198 
i and F-137 Consolidated 
The Hearing Committee Panel appointed by the Board of Bar 
Commissioners comprised of Gerald H. Kinghorn, Randon W. Wilson 
and E. Allan Hunter convened on Thursday, May 15, 1986 at 9:30 
a.m. for hearing pursuant to notice and stipulation of the 
parties at the conference room at the law office of Jones, Waldo, 
Holbrook and McDonough, 170 South Main Street, Suite 1500, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84101. 
The hearing was convened at 9:30 a.m. and recessed until the 
appearance of Mr. Davis or until 10:00 a.m. Mr. Davis appeared 
at 9:59 a.m. Present were Mr. John S. Davis, (herein referred to 
as the Respondent) appearing pro se, Karin Hobfas, counsel for the 
Utah State Bar, Joseph E. Tesch counsel for Charlie Joseph who 
was present pursuant to a subpoena for the Respondent. 
Counsel for the Bar requested a ruling as to whether the 
hearing would proceed pursuant to the Procedures of Discipline of 
the Utah State Bar adopted September 25, 1985 or the provisions 
of Rule 12 of the Rules of Discipline of the Utah State Bar which 
were in effect prior to the adoption of the Procedures of Disci-
pline of the Dtah State Bar of September 25, 1985. 
The Respondent insisted that the prior rules of discipline 
be used for the hearing and all subsequent proceedings. After 
hearing the arguments of counsel and reviewing the material 
documents, the Panel finds that no difference exists between the 
Rules and the Procedures adverse to the Respondent; if the 
Respondent calls the attention of the Panel to a matter where an 
adverse conflict may exist, the Panel will rule on the matter and 
the appropriate rules during the hearing. 
The Panel will apply the Procedures of Discipline of the 
Utah State Bar adopted September 25, 1985 to the hearing except 
as provided more specifically above*. 
The Respondent moved for the exclusion of witnesses to be 
heard by the Panel from the hearing roonu The exclusionary rule 
was invoked and each party was asked to state the name of all 
witnesses to be called. The Panel instructed the witnesses ro 
stand and be sworn. The following persons were named by the 
parties as witnesses: Mr* Randall Hall, Mr* Jeff Paoletti and 
Mr. Charlie Joseph were sworn by the reporter and admonished not 
to discuss their testimony with each other or discuss the subject 
matter of the hearing. 
The Respondent objected to counsel for Mr. Joseph remaining 
during the hearing* Under the public hearing provisions under 
which the Hearing is conducted, Mr. Tesch was allowed to remain 
in the room but was admonished while the witnesses were leaving 
the room not to discuss the opening statements, arguments or 
testimony of witnesses with his client or other witnesses. 
Counsel for the Bar proceeded to make an opening statement. 
At the close of the opening statement by counsel for the Bar, the 
Panel confirmed that the hearing was going forward only under 
Count II of the amended complaint in the consolidated matters 
F-137 and F-198 which alleges that the Respondent was convicted 
of the crime of theft in the second degree, that the trial judge 
reduced the offense to a felony in the third degree; Paragraph 5 
of Count II alleges that the conduct of the Respondent is in vio-
lation of Pule II, Section 4 (1) and Cannon 1, Dr 1-102 (A)(4), 
of the Revised Rules of Professional Conduct of the Utah State 
Bar, Rule ir (a), Rules of Discipline of the Utah State Bar; and 
Paragraph 23, of the Rules for Integration and Management of the 
Utah State Bar. 
The Respondent reserved the right to make an opening state-
ment. 
Counsel for the Bar reviewed the record and specifically the 
answer of the Respondent to the amended complaint. The Respon-
dent objected to the characterization of his answer in paragraph 
2 of the second defense as an admission that he was sentenced on 
November 26, 1982. 
Counsel for the Bar offered proposed Exhibits 1, 2 and 3 as 
evidence. The Respondent examined the proposed exhibits and the 
Respondent haying no objection, Exhibit Nos. 1, 2 and 3 were 
admitted and received in evidence. 
Exhibit No* 4 was then marked and offered as an exhibit 
which is the transcript and record on appeal to the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah in the case of State v. Davis 689 P. 2d 5 
(Utah 1984) . The Respondent requested time to examine the 
exhibit and the Panel proposed that counsel for the parties 
disclose all their proposed exhibits to each other, have them 
numbered, organized and examined by counsel during a recess. 
Upon resuming the hearing, counsel for the Bar offered 
proposed Exhibit No* 4 consisting of subparts 4a, 4b, 4c and 4d. 
Mr* Davis objected on the grounds that the exhibit is irrelevant. 
The panel ruled that the exhibit would be received into evidence, 
reserving to th'e panel the discretion to. determine the relevancy 
and weight of the evidence; Exhibit No* 4 was admitted. 
Proposed Exhibit No. 5 was marked and offered; the Respon-
dent offered the same objection as to relevancy to proposed 
Exhibit No*. 5 and the Panel ruled that the exhibit would be 
received subject to the same reservation of discretion as to 
relevancy and weight* 
Counsel for the Bar then called Mr. Randall Hall as a 
witness. Prior to the examination of Mr. Hall, Bar Counsel 
requested that the panel rule that based on the exhibits the 
Respondent has been convicted of a crime as charged in Count II 
of the Amended Complaint. 
After hearing the arguments of counsel and examining the 
exhibits, the panel ruled that the Bar had sustained its burden 
of proof by clear and convincing evidence that the Respondent was 
convicted of a crime and a judgment of conviction was entered. 
The finding of the Panel expressly is without prejudice to Mr. 
Davis opportunity to argue the issues presently before the 
Supreme Court or other technical issues relevant to the 
conviction, mitigation or cause for disbarment. The finding of 
the Panel includes the reservation by the Respondent and renewal 
of the Respondents pre-trial motions* 
Mr* Hall was then sworn and examined by Counsel for the Bar. 
Proposed Exhibit No. 6 was marked for identification, offered and 
admitted into evidence with no objection from the Respondent. 
Mr. ffall was cross-examined by Mr- Davis. Mr. Davis offered 
proposed Exhibit K which was received in evidence without ob-
jection. Proposed Exhibit J was offered by Mr. Davis after 
identification by the witness and received in evidence without 
objection. 
Examination of the witness was concluded by the parties. 
Members of zhe panel asked the witness certain questions the 
witness was excused. 
Counsel for the Bar then informed the Court that the Bar did 
not intend to call any further witnessesr however specific notice 
should be taken of the case of State vs. Davis. 
Counsel for the Bar having rested, the Respondent was 
invited to proceed. 
The Respondent moved for dismissal of the complaint on the 
basis of the provisions of 76-3-402 (2) (b) . After hearing the 
arguments of counsel, examining the statute, the exhibits and 
after considering additional grounds for the Motion to Dismiss as 
stated by the Petitioner that the Bar had failed to sustain its 
burden of proof on the remainder of the charges in Count II, the 
Respondent's motions to dismiss were denied. 
The Respondent made an opening statement in which he renewed 
the pre-trial motions heard by the Panel on prior occasions. 
The Respondent called Jeff Paoletti as a witness. Mr. 
Paoletti was seated and examined by the Respondent. After the 
examination of the Respondent, Counsel for the Bar declined to 
cross-examine Mr. Paoletti. 
The Respondent called Mr. Charlie Joseph as- a witness. 
Counsel for Mr. Joseph requested an opportunity to consult with 
Bar counsel with respect to protective matters regarding Mr. 
Joseph. The Panel briefly recessed and reconvened the hearing 
for further proceedings. 
Counsel for the Bar stated a continuing objection to the 
testimony of Mr. Joseph as being irrelevant to the issues defined 
by the Respondent during his opening statement and on the basis 
that the Respondent was attempting to relitigate the issue of 
guilt or innocence in the criminal matter. After hearing the 
arguments of counsel, the objection of Bar Counsel was overruled 
and the Respondent was permitted to proceed to examine Mr. 
Charlie Joseph based on Rule 23 of the Rules of Integration and 
Management of the Utah State Bar and the case of In Re: Kline D. 
Strong 615 P.2d, 583 (Utah 1980). 
The Respondent then examined Mr. Joseph. After examination 
by the Respondent, the witness was cross-examined by counsel for 
the Bar and after cross-examination by Counsel for the Bar, the 
Respondent examined Mr* Joseph based on issues raised during the 
cross-examination by Bar counsel. The Panel directed certain 
questions to the witness and the Respondent moved that the 
testimony elicited by the Panel be stricken or in the alter-
native, that he be given an opportunity to further examine the 
witness. The Respondent received assurance from the Panel that 
the entire transcript would be read and reviewed before a 
decision is rendered* The Panel allowed the Respondent to 
re-examine Mr* Joseph. Thereafter Mr* Joseph was excused from 
the proceedings* 
The Respondent indicated that he intended to introduce one 
more document which counsel for the Bar stipulated could be 
admitted* The document is a pre-sentence report prepared for the 
Fourth District: Court by the Division of Adult Probation and 
Parole. 
The Respondent indicated that his version of the incident 
was adequately explained in the report of the Division of Adult 
Probation and Parole and therefore he would not testify. After 
admission of the stipulated exhibit, the Respondent rested. 
Counsel for the Bar made a closing statement, citing certain 
cases and providing copies of the cases to members of the Panel. 
Upon the conclusion of the closing statement of Counsel for the 
Bar, Mr. Davis was invited to make a closing statement• During 
the closing statement by Mr. Davis, certain questions were asked 
by the Panel to clarify the issues Mr. Davis felt were relevant 
for the Panelfs consideration. 
The Respondent was permitted to introduce certain additional 
illustrative exhibits which were prepared by him, subject to the 
objection of Bar Counsel as to the foundation for the exhibits. 
After the closing statements of the parties, a spontaneous 
statement was made on the record by Carol B. Davis, the wife of 
the Respondent over the objection, of Bar Counsel. Mrs. Davis was 
not sworn, however, the Panel permitted the statement by Mrs. 
Davis* 
At 6z56 p.iiu the record was closed after having received all 
exhibits, evidence and statements of counsel. 
Based upon the exhibits, testimony and all of the evidence, 
the Panel makes the following: 
FILINGS OF FACT 
1. The Respondent is a member of the Utah State Bar and is 
the same person as the Defendant in the case of The State of Utah 
vs. John Shepard Davis, 689 P.2d 5 (Utah 1984). 
2- The Respondent was convicted of the crime of theft, a 
felony in the second degree and sentenced by the Court pursuant 
to the discretion of the District Court, to a sentence for theft, 
a felony in the third degree. 
3. The sentence and conviction of the Respondent were 
appealed to the Supreme Court of Utah and the decision of the 
jury and trial court were affirmed* 
4* The Respondent engaged in conduct which was dishonest 
and deceitful by appropriating funds to his own use, which were 
the property of clients without their consent, by failing to 
disclose to the client the disbursement of the client's funds and 
attempting to prevent the client from the discovery of the 
disbursement of funds and by the use of such funds for personal 
expenditures* 
5. The Respondent introduced no evidence in mitigation of 
the conviction of theft or to be considered for the purpose of 
these proceedings and the claims in the complaints herein * 
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Panel makes the 
following Conclusions and Recommendation: 
1- The crime of theft and the circumstances of the con-
viction of the Respondent constitute conduct involving moral 
turpitude and therefore the Respondent violated Rule 2, Section 4 
(1) of the Revised Rules of Professional Conduct of the Utah 
State Bar. 
2*. The conviction of the Defendant of the crime of theft 
constitutes a violation of Rule 2(a) of the Rules of Discipline 
of the Utah State Bar in that the crime was a crime involving 
moral turpitude* 
3. The Respondent is subject to a judgment of disbarment 
pursuant to Paragraph 23 of the Rules for Integration and Manage-
ment of the Utah State Bar having been convicted of a crime 
involving moral turpitude. 
4. The Respondent should be disbarred and his name 
stricken from the register of attorneys in the State of Utah. 
5. No mitigating circumstances exist to provide a basis 
for any sanction other than disbarment. 
DATED this I % day of NftJltn &lfi- , 1986. 
GEHALD- H 7 krsteHORN 
